16th BOMBARDMENT GROUP, (VH)
(315 BOMBARDMENT WING (VH))
20TH AIR FORCE
PERIOD: 1 August 1945 to "VJ" DAY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
END OF THE WAR ................................................................ 3
The Dominating Factor ..................................................... 3
THE COMBAT RECORD ............................................................. 5
General ................................................................... 5
Mitsubishi-Hayama Refinery Complex......................................... 5
Ube Coal Liquefaction Co .................................................. 6
Nippon Oil Refinery and Tank Farm ......................................... 7
Tsuchizaki ................................................................ 8
PRISONER OF WAR MISSIONS ......................................................10
Shift to Peace.............................................................10
A SHOW OF FORCE ...............................................................13
COMBAT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY..................................................16
Other Maintenance Sections ................................................21
The Problem ...............................................................22
The Educational Program ...................................................23
Athletic Program ..........................................................24
ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL ..................................................27
Few Problems ..............................................................27
Key Personnel Changes .....................................................27
Unexpected Arrivals .......................................................28
LIST OF DOCUMENTS (ORIGINAL ONLY) .............................................35
DOCUMENTS (ORIGINAL ONLY) .....................................................37
END OF THE WAR
The Dominating Factor
The dominating factor in the life and history of the Group in August
was the end of the war. All events were overshadowed by this change which
affected every aspect of the organization's activities.
There was little or no celebration in the Group area when the sur-
render of Japan was finally announced as crews were still returning from
their final mission to the Empire at the time. Furthermore, the wildest
celebrating took place on the night that the Japanese first announced their
willingness to discuss peace terms.
But the change in the mission and future of the organization became
apparent at once. There was a perceptible - although confused - switch from a
wartime to a peacetime basis.
Emphasis was placed upon a solution to the problem of occupying spare
time on an island which offered few natural diversions. Plans for construc-
tion of an Officers' Club and an Enlisted Men's Club were speeded and an
education and recreation program to affect everyone in the Group was set
Nevertheless, operational flying did not cease at once. B-29s were
sent to the Empire and to Manchuria to parachute supplies to Allied Pri-
soners of War and a mission was flown over Tokyo on the day that surren-
der terms were signed in Tokyo Bay. On this flight, ground crew personnel
were taken as passengers.
Under the press of these events, the astounding results of the last
four missions against Japan were almost forgotten. Nevertheless, they in-
cluded one of the greatest triumphs in the organization's history -- the at-
tack against the Ube Coal Liquefaction Co.
THE COMBAT RECORD
There were four missions flown during the month of August and each
resulted in the virtual destruction of an important Japanese petroleum re-
finery. The tactics of radar bombing from individual aircraft were con-
The organization had been given verbal instructions by the 315th
Wing to prepare for attacks against nitrogen plants and later bridges. But
the unexpected end of the war called off this campaign.
Neither crew members nor aircraft were lost during August and enemy
opposition continued to be weak although on one mission nine aircraft suf-
fered slight damage from flak. On no occasion did enemy fighters press home
Three of the four missions were flown by the entire wing against
single targets but on the first attack the wing was split into two parts.
The 16th and 502nd Groups attacked the Mitsubishi-Hayama Petroleum Complex
while the 501st and the 331st Groups attacked the Kawasaki Petroleum Cen-
Mitsubishi-Hayama Refinery Complex
The first attack of the month was directed against the Mitsubishi-
Hayama Refinery Complex at Kawasaki.1/ This target had previously been bomb-
ed on 25-26 July but damage had not been sufficient to render the complex
The attack was made on the night of 1-2 August by aircraft of the
16th and 502nd Groups.
The 16th Group was scheduled to send 37 aircraft and 36 actually
took off from Northwest Field. Of these, 35 bombed the primary target
and one bombed a bridge South of Shizouka.
Medium and heavy flak was encountered but it was predominately in-
accurate despite the fact that nine Group aircraft suffered minor damage.
An estimated 20 enemy fighter planes were sighted2/ and two opened ineffective
Iwo Jima again proved its value as two Group B-29s with mechanical
troubles landed there for repairs. The rest made the round trip between
Guam and Japan with no major difficulties.
The damage assessment report was received on 10 August3/ and listed
the Mitsubishi Oil Refinery as "practically inoperative." The Hayama
Petroleum Refinery was said to have received "crippling damage" with 40
per cent of its primary structure destroyed.
In addition to the principal targets, five industrial installa-
tions in the immediate vicinity were struck and in most cases the damage
was listed as severe.
Ube Coal Liquefaction Co.
This was the most spectacular mission in which the 16th Group parti-
cipated. The Ube Coal Liquefaction Co.-important because it ws a synthe-
tic production unit-had previously been raided on 22-23 July and had been
damaged to the extent of 31 per cent.
The blockade of Japan had cut off the enemy's major supply of crude
petroleum and he was forced to get his needed petroleum products largely
through synthetic methods. Therefore, the importance of Ube had increas-
The attack against the plant was launched on 5-6 August by the en-
tire 315th Wing. The 16th Group sent 30 Aircraft on the mission and none
aborted and none were damaged.4/
Flak was meager and inaccurate and the estimated 17 enemy aircraft
that were sighted produced only three unaggressive attacks.5/ Tweny-eight
16th Group aircraft bombed the primary target, one bombed Shimizu and one
bombed Hososhima. Two landed at Iwo Jima on the return trip for refueling.
The damage assessment was not available until 22 August but it re-
vealed a spectacular bombardment job.6/ The refining units of the plant
were 100 percent destroyed or damaged and 80 per cent of the stores and
workshops were destroyed or damaged. In addition, 50 percent of the Ube
Iron Works Co. had been damaged.
The reconnaissance photographs were even more impressive than the
report. The Ube company was located at the water's edge and retaining
walls apparently had been burst by the attack. A majority of the plant
Nippon Oil Refinery and Tank Farm
The 315th Wing hit the Nippon Oil Refinery and Tank Farm at Amaga-
saki on 9-10 August.7/ The 16th Group supplied 27 aircraft for the mission.
The wing had hit the target on 19-20 July and destroyed or damaged 48 struc-
Despite the heavy defenses in the area, only one group aircraft suf-
fered damage and it was of a minor nature. An estimated four enemy air-
craft were airborne but they pressed home no attacks. Anti-radar tactics
employed by the wing apparently confused the ground defenses.
As a result of this mission, the plant ws "almost completely de-
stroyed.8/ Damage was well distributed throughout the target area and only
two storage tanks were left standing.
The final target of the 16th Group was the Nippon Oil Refinery at
Tsuchizaki.9/ It was located in the far Northern part of the island of Hon-
shu and the surrounding terrain was of such a nature that it presented a
difficult return to follow on the radar scope.
The Group scheduled 38 aircraft for the mission and for the first
time 100-lb GP bombs were used. Each aircraft carried 164, making a total
load of more than eight tons. One aircraft aborted and one landed at Iwo
Jima on the trip to Tsuchizaki. But the remaining 36 dropped their bombs
on the primary target.
Enemy air opposition was nonexistent and flak was meager and inac-
curate. There was practically no opposition in the target area.
The mission was flown the night before the Japanese government an-
nounced its final decision to surrender and in the morning crews were in-
formed of the peace upon their return from the mission. They were tired
from the long trip and there was little celebration but the usual interro-
gations were rushed through hurriedly.
Results of the mission were not available until 6 September when the
315th Wing Photo Intelligence section sent to the Group a preliminary study
of reconnaissance photographs.10/ It was estimated that the refinery was "al-
most completely destroyed or damaged" and that repairing the plant would
take as much time as building a new one.
PRISONER OF WAR MISSIONS
Shift to Peace
The transition from war to peace in the mission of the 16th Bombard-
ment Group was abrupt. While there were still flights over Japanese terri-
tory they became missions of relief rather than missions of destruction.
The problem of dropping supplies to Prisoners of War was difficult.
In the first place, most of the camps were small and hard to locate. And
even more important was the great distance that had to be flown on some of
Accurate information was lacking on several of the camps, especially
those located in Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese had apparently shifted
many of the prisoners around and closed down some of the concentration cen-
The supplies were packed at Tinian and Group aircraft had to first
land at that island and load their aircraft. Their loads were brought back
to Northwest Field to be scientifically loaded by armorers.
Most of the supplies were dropped with the aid of a parachute but
certain types of packages were permitted to fall free. The bombardier on
each B-29 had quite a problem in determining the exact moment of release.
It was feared that the Japanese government had not distributed suf-
ficient information to the POW camps to enable the prisoners to set up the
proper markings. If this were true, they would be almost impossible to
find as in many instances no aerial photographs were available and they
could be located only approximately.
On the 29-30 August, six Group aircraft were dispatched to the is-
land of Honshu to locate a series of camps scattered in various areas.11/
With one exception, these experienced a fair degree of success in locating
But all supplies were dropped in some POW camp and the aircrews,
who were required to make three runs over the target, could clearly see
the prisoners picking up and opening the bundles. They reported that the
POWs seemed to have the run of whatever territory in which they were loca-
On the same day, three B-29s were dispatched to drop supplies on a
camp on the island of Shikoku.12/ The crews reported that they dropped their
supplies on the target but one crew witnessed two truck loads of Japanese
soldiers making off with 33 bundles that fell outside the compound.
The longest flights were made to Mukden in Manchuria where there were
reportedly three prison camps. However, evidence that was gathered by the
crews indicated that two had been abandoned or had never existed.
On 29-30 August, nine aircraft made the flight13/ and were unable to
locate two of the camps upon which they had been briefed. However, the
third was located in a slightly different position than was anticipated.
Two of the aircraft succeeded in establishing radio contact with
the POWs who said there was no other prison camp within 100 miles of Mukden.
The prisoners were overjoyed that relief had appeared and indicated that
they were in fairly good condition. They had a "walkie-talkie" set which
they used in talking to the crews of the B-29s.
Eleven more aircraft were sent to Muken the following day14/ to de-
termine definitely whether other camps were in the area as well as to drop
supplies. They were unable to find any other concentration centers and
managed to drop most of their packages within the area of the one located
compound. They were informed by the prisoners that no more supplies were
SHOW OF FORCE
On 2 September the 16th Group participated in the "Show of Force"
mission over Tokyo which took place while the surrender terms were being
signed on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The mission was careful-
ly planned as it represented the first attempt at formation flying that
the organization had made since its arrival overseas.
On this mission, ground crew members were taken along as passengers
and four were assigned to each aircraft. There were more applicants than
could be handled and many had to be rejected for lack of parachutes.
The aircraft flew over Tokyo Bay just as the surrender terms were
signed and the men could watch the Missouri at the same time that they heard
the broadcast of the ceremony over the radio. The B-29s flew at approxi-
mately 3,000 feet and could see clearly through a scattered undercast.
This was the first occasion on which the men of the 16th Group were
able to see the damage that had been done to Japan. On all bombardment
missions, they had flown at night, usually through a thick overcast.
The men reported on their return that Tokyo targets had been "com-
pletely wiped out" and that they could see big holes which had been dug by
the Japanese to use as shelters during the raids. Some parts of the city
had been flattened and in others only a few twisted girders and walls were
still standing, they said.
They said that there was a steady stream of ships going in and out
of Tokyo Bay and that some of the remnants of the Japanese fleet could be
seen in the harbor. These vessels, they added, could be spotted easily be-
cause of their battered condition.
On the same day as the "show of force" mission over tokyo, the 16th
Group suffered the loss of 10 of its members in an aircraft accident.15/ They
were on a mission to drop supplies to a Prisoner of War camp in Osaka.
The aircraft, commanded by First Lieutenant George R. Hutchison,
took off for the flight early in the morning. It carried as passenger Cap-
tain James O. Clark, 16th Squadron S-2 Officer, and Captain Lewis P. Town,
15th Squadron Engineering Officer.
A few hours after take-off, the crew called the tower at Northwest
Field and said the aircraft had developed mechanical difficulties which
were not explained. Lieutenant Hutchison had decided to return to base and
The aircraft circled the field for a few hours to use up gasoline and
lighten its load. Finally it came in for what at first seemed to be a nor-
mal landing. But at the last moment, it swerved, hit a wingtip on a tree
and burst into flames.
The only members of the crew who were saved were two gunners-Serge-
ant Davis R. Flynt, Jr., and Corporal James A. Humbird. The aircraft broke
into two parts and they were able to get out of the tail section.
The dead included: Lieutenant Hutchison, Airplane Commander; First
Lieutenant Carl W. Strait, Pilot; First Lieutenant Lester R. Nahouse, Navi-
gator; Second Lieutenant William E. Bradley, Jr., Bombardier; Second Lieu-
tenant Robert H. Yost, Radar Operator; Flight Officer Thomas G. Passarello,
Flight Engineer; Sergeant Leonard Steveson, Radio Operator and Sergeant Mel-
vin E. Berkey, Gunner.
The funeral was held the following day in the Group briefing room
and both the Catholic Chaplain, Captain Bernard J. Gannon, and the Pro-
testant Chaplain, Captain Donald W. Zimmerman, officiated. Following the
services, the bodies were interred in a Marine Corps cemetery South of Agana.
COMBAT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY
The final month of operations witnessed the solution of several
problems which had been affecting the task of the 16th Bombardment Group.
With one major exception-aircraft engines-the supply shortages which had
plagued the maintenance sections were solved.
The sudden and unexpected end of the war meant that some problems
were written off and further attempts to find a solution were abandoned.
An important example was the operational failure of the APG-15--the tail
gun radar set.
At first it was presumed that maintenance would become a matter
of keeping equipment from deterioration and that the equipment itself
would be put to no use. But this concept quickly evaporated under the
impact of a number of missions most of which consisted of dropping sup-
plies to Prisoner of War camps in Japan and Manchuria.
Therefore, maintenance personnel found that their duties were not
lightened to any great degree. However, it was possible to assign them
regular hours and they were able to depend upon receiving their off-duty
time with some advance knowledge.
The watchword for the month in the Engineering section was engine
conservation. On 4 August, a TWX directed all sections to make the utmost
effort to conserve engines as there was an island-wide shortage.17/
Under the new policy, no engine changes were to be made unless they
were absolutely necessary. Even a complete change of cylinders was called
for before a new engine could be installed.
Captain Hosler, the Group Combat Maintenance Officer, said his
section would have little trouble with the engine shortage even though
it did present a potential difficulty. Since the TWX had been received,
he asserted, only five or six cylinders had been changed on any one en-
gine and no great trouble had been encountered.
During the period that the organization had been overseas, he con-
tinued, there had been approximately 30 engine changes. He added that he
did not anticipate any increase in this rate.
The end of the war, he declared, did not mean the end of work for
the Engineering section. "The B-29 is a bigger problem sitting still
than it is when running," he asserted.
Within a few days of the final mission flown against Japan, he said,
certain types of equipment began to deteriorate because of disuse. The
major cause of this deterioration was fungus growth which established it-
self on electrical parts and whose elimination required constant atten-
Furthermore, he pointed out, the entire Maintenance section was
faced with the task of constructing facilities to meet the requirements
of a peacetime army air base. These facilities had been ignored during
the war because of the presence of more pressing tasks.
He said that a series of quonsets would be constructed to provide
permanent offices for the maintenance sections and that housing would be
required for equipment. Plans called for elimination of all tentage ex-
cept in the ordnance area, he added.
Recalling the history of this organization during its overseas per-
iod, Captain Hosler said that the principal maintenance deficiency had been
a lack of auxiliary equipment. At no time, he declared, had the Engineer-
ing section been provided with a sufficient number of tugs, Cletracs,
"Christmas Tree" lights or similar items. Improvisations had been devis-
ed but they were far from satisfactory.
For a long period of time there had been a serious deficiency in
spare parts, he said, but this lack had been solved towards the end of
the operational period. However, the shortage of replacement tools con-
tinued right up to the end of the war.
The Armament section ended the war with ample equipment and with
a sufficient number of skilled men in every branch except bombsight main-
tenance. It was one of the few sections that was not hampered seriously
by shortages of some type.
One of the most remarkable achievements performed by a mainten-
ance section in the organization was chalked up to the credit of the arm-
orers prior to the last strike against Japan. It was the loading of 38
aircraft with 164 X 100-lb GP bombs in clusters in each aircraft.
No member of the section had even loaded GP bombs in an aircraft
in this manner previously and no one knew of any precedents. Normally,
only incendiaries are loaded in clusters. Nevertheless, no bombs had
to be jettisoned on this mission because of the unorthodox method of
The job presented considerable difficulty as 100-lb GP bombs are
loaded by hand instead of by a hoist. Approximately 80 men worked for
17 hours lifting the bombs into place and after the task had been accom-
plished many were so tired they were unable to raise their arms above
The missions to drop supplies to Prisoner of War camps brought
additional work to the Armament section as the supplies were loaded in the
bomb bays by armorers. But there was a sufficient number available so
they could be scheduled to work in shifts and for the first time since
they had arrived on Guam they were able to look forward to regular off-
The air conditioned vault for bombsights was finally installed dur-
ing the middle of the month. This cut down the amount of maintenance work
that had formerly been required on these instruments.
With the end of the war, the problem of operating the APG-15 was
dismissed as a bad job. The final tabulation demonstrated that it was
unsatisfactory and that its highest performance rate on any mission had
been 50 percent.
Attaining even this performance figure had demanded heroic efforts
out of all proportion to the amount of maintenance that should be required
of a unit in the field. It meant constant supervision, detailed checks
and thorough instructions of the tail gunners18/ as well as maintenance per-
With the conclusion of hostilities, the Electronics section limit-
ed maintenance of the set to preventive measures to ward off deterioration.
It was generally believed that more research work was necessary before the
set could hope to function effectively under combat conditions.
But on the bright side of the picture was the performance of the
APQ-7. A final tabulation showed results beyond all expectations in the
maintenance of a set just barely out of the experimental stage.
Wing headquarters had set 10 percent as the maximum number of fail-
ures with which the APQ-7 could be considered efficient. But the total
number of failures in the 16th Bombardment Group was two per cent. Fur-
thermore, the average range on the scope was stepped up to 96 miles on
the next to last mission, compared to a previous average of 87 miles and
an original average of about 67 miles.
The Electronics section had had little or no experience with the
APQ-7 prior to joining the Group and considerable maintenance difficulties
had been encountered during the training period. Knowledge of the set
had to be picked up by men who had already begun to maintain it and who
were admittedly without the necessary training.
Furthermore, their training had not been under the conditions pre-
valent on Guam where extreme humidity led to deterioration of parts and
where exposed surfaces, such as the radar wing, were liable to bombard-
ment by chunks of coral while an aircraft was taxiing on the field.
Nevertheless, all these factors were met and the difficulties solv-
ed as has been described in previous chapters of this history. In fact,
operation of the set was improved by the establishment of careful alignment
After the conclusion of the war, there was little need for the APQ-7,
which was primarily a bombardment instrument. But the Electronics sec-
tion operated each set on the ground an hour every day to keep the mois-
ture out. Shifts were established to permit the men working in the sec-
tion the maximum amount of free time.
Other Maintenance Sections
Other maintenance sections which are normally included in this
part of the history are eliminated this month because they had no new
or unusual problems. With the war concluded, there was little for them
to do and a majority of the maintenance men were sent back to their squa-
drons for duty in the area. Many were put to work on various construc-
A few projects which had been underway were abandoned. These in-
cluded the installation of RCM devices in B-29s and improvement of radar
scope cameras to give an indication of range during the bomb release.
The conclusion of the war brought the Group face to face with a
serious morale problem. It required no great amount of insight or any
intensive study to discover that the men were dispirited and had lost
the enthusiasm that they possessed while the organization was actually
There was a widespread feeling that the Group-which had been over-
seas for less than six months-would be one of the last to return to the
United States. And the number of men who had sufficient discharge points
to leave the army was small.
Even more serious was the fact that there was not sufficient work
to keep the men fully occupied. Even the Prisoner of War missions did
not require enough maintenance and preparation to keep everyone busy.
The island of Guam offered few diversions and most of those had
been thoroughly explored by the men. They could go swimming or go on
sightseeing trips around the island. That was literally all. And even
the sightseeing was restricted to some extent because a few Japanese were
still in hiding in the jungles and presented a threat to any stray explor-
In the 16th Group area, a small Red Cross hut, the theater, a base-
ball field, some volleyball courts and the Field Exchange represented the
only forms of recreation. These were excellent as far as they went but
they did not go far enough. They were all "strictly GI" and did not pre-
sent the break from Army routine which the men obviously needed.
To meet this problem, plans were laid out along three broad out-
lines. They were a large scale educational program, an athletic program
and a recreation program. It was realized that none of these could ful-
ly meet the basic needs of the men but they could alleviate the situation.
The Educational Program
The educational program was probably the most ambitious as it pre-
sented the gratest departure from previous practice. Furthermore, it
called for very careful planning to obatin the utmost use of personnel
The Information and Education section headed by Second Lieuten-
ant B.F. Eason, Jr., investigated the problem and presented its conclusions
in the form of a staff study19/ to a meeting of the Group staff late in Au-
gust. At the time, it was impossible to adopt a program due to lack of
directives from higher echelons but preliminary work continued along the
lines of the I and E proposals.
The plan called for a six-hour duty day in which part of the duty
was to consist of a compulsory athletic or edcuation program. The Group
personnel were to be given their choice of classes or of athletic train-
ing but some form of activity was to be required.
The educational classes were to be divided into four general sec-
tion-commercial, liberal arts, science and industrial-technical. These
were to be at both high school and college levels to suit the needs of the
The technical equipment of the organization was requested for use
in teaching the industrial-technical subjects and it was proposed to draw
the instructors from maintenance personnel. It was expected that most
of the classes sought would be in commercial and industrial subjects.
Prior to the end of the war, the I and E section had consisted
of two men-Lieutenant Eason and Corporal Leonard M. Scherer. Obvious-
ly, this personnel was insufficient to carry on an ambitious edcuation
program and additional clerks and draftsmen were requested.
In addition to the education activities, the I and E section pro-
posed to carry on a vocational guidance program of a limited character.
This could not be fully developed due to the lack of trained personnel
but there was a considerable amount of written material on the subject
which the office had at its disposal.
A basic consideration of the entire program was that it could not
be approached as merely a time killing device. To accomplish its pur-
pose, the underlying approach had to be that of preparing the men to re-
enter civilian life. For that reason, the vocational guidance assumed
a great amount of importance.
The I and E section screened Group personnel in a search for in-
structors and uncovered quite a bit of talent. Several former high school
and trade school teachers were produced and several men with sufficient
experience or education.
But at the present time, the education program is in abeyance
while instructions from higher echelons of command, as well as text books
and other materials, are awaited.
At the conclusion of the war, the athletic equipment which had
formerly been handled by the special Service branch was segregated and
placed under the control of an informal athletics office. First Lieu-
tenant Donald A. Meagher, the Group Gunnery Officer, took charge of this
Lieutenant Meagher made plans for the organizaitnon of Group base-
ball and volley ball teams and several areas were set aside for athletic
events. An Officers' team was formed by Lieutenant Eason and other or-
ganizations on the island were challenged to games.
Unfortunately, the climate of Guam was not altogether suited for
strenuous athletics. The noon period was far too hot and sticky and
while the evenings were cool, darkness fell speedily and prevented out-
As there were no natural facilities available, recreation centers
had to be planned and constructed by the Group. The two opon which ac-
tual work first started were the Service Club for Enlisted Men and the
Construction with voluntary labor began as soon as the Japanese
had surrendered and by the beginning of September both were well on their
way to completion. They were wooden buildings and were so designed as
to provide plenty of floor space.
Plans for construction of a theater were temporarily laid aside
as it was believed that the outdoor theater already in use could continue
to serve for the time being. The two clubs were considered the primary
A hut had been constructed for the Red Cross to use when distri-
buting coffee to the crews at the conclusion of missions. As soon as
the war had ended and it became apparent that there would be no more
missions, James Adams, Red Cross Field Director, moved into the hut as
He was thus able to make games and other recreational equipment
available which formerly had been kept sealed for lack of proper stor-
ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL
There were no unusual administrative problems in the final month
of the organization's combat career. The Unit Personnel system which had
been established shortly before leaving the United Statees continued to
Some minor confusion was caused by the conflict between an organi-
zation set up to function as a Group Headquarters with three subordinate
squadrons but actually functioning as a consolidated Group. This became
very apparent whenever promotions were discussed.
Under the authorized set up, most of the promotions were controlled
by the Squadron commanders. But a majority of the men were working in con-
solidated Group maintenance or administrative sections which had no con-
nection with their squadrons.
As a result, there were some instances of conflict between the de-
sires of Section Chiefs for promoting men and the desires of Squadron com-
manders. In most of these cases a solution acceptable to both was found.
Key Personnel Changes
There were two major changes in key personnel during the month. The
first was brought about by the departure of Major Oliver C. Mosman, Jr.,
Group Intelligence Officer. As he was over 42 years of age, he was sent
back to the United States to be discharged.
On 30 August, Captain James L. Parker, Group Photo-interpreter, as-
sumed the position of Group Intelligence Officer.20/ He had been on Detached
Service to the 315th Wing.
The other major change involved Major Zed S. Smith III, the Group
Operations Officer. As he possessed the required number of discharge points,
he was also sent back to the United States to be released from the ser-
Major John S. Gillespie, Group Flight Test Engineer, was shifted
to replace Major Smith.21/ Major Gillespie had, for a considerable period,
been the Assistant Group Operations Officer.
Two days later, Captain Donald W. Goodhart, Airplane Commander in
the 15th Squadron, was transferred to Group Headquarters and given the pri-
mary duty of Group Flight Test Engineer.22/
The war had just barely ended when nine replacement crews were as-
signed to the 16th Bomb Group.23/ Since Group losses had been relatively
slight, they presented a problem.
It was decided to bring them up to a minimum standards of profici-
ency and they were placed through the complete training course for crews
in the Marianas, excepting only the bombing of Rota and Truk.
Photo of B-29 nose art of a bear in a baseball uniform holding
a bat and the name Chicago Cubs painted on the right side of the aircraft.
On Guam a Chicago officer does not forget
the home team. Lt. Yuska poses with his
crew in fron of their B-29 shortly before
the last mission.
Pages 29 through 34 contain photos of Group personnel, yet to be copied.
List of Documents
1/ Mission Summary, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the Intelligence Officer,
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 2 August 1945.
2/ Operational Report, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the Operations Officer,
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 2 August 1945.
3/ Damage Assessment Report 173, C.I.U. XXI Bomber Command, APO 234, c/o
Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 10 August 1945.
4/ Mission Summary, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the Intelligence Officer,
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 6 August 1945.
5/ Operational Report, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the Operations Officer,
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 6 August 1945.
6/ Unnumbered Memorandum, Hq. 315th Bomb Wg., Consolidated Photo Intelligence
Section, APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 6 August
1945, SUBJECT: Damage Assessment to Targets of 315th Bomb Wg (Mission #13)
TO: To All Concerned, dd 22 August 1945.
7/ Mission Summary, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the Intelligence Officer,
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 10 August 1945.
8/ Unnumbered Memorandum, Hq. 315th Bomb Wg., Consolidated Photo Intelligence
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., SUBJECT: Damage Assess-
ment to Targets of 315th Bomb Wg (Mission #14) TO: To All Concerned, dd
22 August 1945.
9/ Mission Summary, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the Intelligence Officer,
APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 15 August 1945.
10/ Ltr., Hq. 315th Bomb Wg., Consolidated Photo Intelligence, APO #182, c/o
Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., SUBJECT: Damage Assessment Target
90.6-1066 TO: CG, 315th Bomb WG, APO #182, c.o Postmaster, San Francisco,
Calif., (THRU: AC/S,A-2) dd 6 September 1945.
11/ Informal Summary of Prisoner of War Missions Flown 29-30 August.
14/ Informal Summary of Prisoner of War Missions Flown 30-31 August.
15/ Final Report on Prisoner of War Missions submitted to 315th Bomb Wg by 16 Gp.
16/ WDAAF Form No. 14, Army Air Forces Report of Major Accident, submitted by
Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., on AC 44-84077 which crashed 1 September 1945.
17/ TWX, File No. 452.11, From COMGENBOMGWG 315 TO: All Groups, SUBJECT:
18/ Ltr., A-3 Gunnery, Wing Gunnery School, Capt. Eugene C. Armstrong O/C
SUBJECT: AN/APG15B Training Course, TO: Major W. H. Pierce, Director
of Special Project (EFR#I), dd 5 August 1945.
19/ Ltr., Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., Office of the I & E Officer, APO 182, c/o
Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., SUBJECT: Plan for Information and
Education Program, this Group, Post-Hostilities Period, TO: CO, 16th
Bomb Gp., APO 182, c/o/ Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd 17 August
20/ SO #70, Par. 3, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
Calif., dd 30 August 1945.
21/ SO #69, Par. 3, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
Calif., dd 28 August 1945.
22/ SO #70, Par. 2, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., APO #182, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
Calif., dd 30 August 1945.
23/ SO #65, Par. 1, and SO #66, Par. 1, Hq. 16th Bomb Gp., APO #182, c/o
Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., dd respectively 16 August 1945 and 17
Several photos are included in the history, but have not yet been reproduced for inclusion on this web page.
There also exists several pages of documents, that have yet to be transcribed. This data consists of special orders, memorandum, report forms and copies of TWX messages. This will take a long time to transcribe and I wanted to focus on transcription of the unit history first. Hopefully, my fingers will be able to stand this.